Abstracts
This research investigates whether CEOs using twitter (CEO twitters) influence their compensation. First, we find that CEO_twitters have a significantly positive relation to total compensation (TDC1), confirming that CEO twitters really have effects on compensation. We also examine whether posting more tweets can curtail the market responses to the earning announcements. In addition, the effect is more salient in the sample of higher information asymmetry. Besides, the effect of CEO Twitters becomes stronger when firms have a high product market competition. Overall, our findings support that CEO with twitter account receive more total CEO compensation.
Keywords: CEO Twitter; compensation; abnormal return; information asymmetry.
JEL classification: G21; G32; G34.
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Ban biên tập Tạp chí Kinh tế & Quản trị Kinh doanh
Phòng 514, Nhà điều hành, trường Đại học Kinh tế & Quản trị Kinh doanh
Địa chỉ: Phường Tân Thịnh, thành phố Thái Nguyên
Email: tapchikt-qtkd@tueba.edu.vn; Điện thoại: 0208.3903373
